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This article focuses on the relation between demographic impact
and social insurance and consists of two distinct yet closely related
sections. The first section introduces a three overlapping generation
model which tries to determine the ageing effects on the individual
consumption and saving decisions in a partial equilibrium approach.
The second section, instead, aims at providing a theory on the need
to set up an ad hoc non self-sufficiency fund. It is shown that this
mandatory and universal social insurance can guarantee a relatively
higher ex-post individual welfare level when the individual fails to
get insured and makes his decisions in uncertainty conditions, that
is, reacting to risks in an imperfect way through the setting up of a
precautionary saving fund. [JEL Classifications: J14, J22, H55]
1. - Foreword
The silent demographic revolution characterising the main
industrialised countries is an unavoidable factor which has major
economic, social, cultural and psychological implications. The
change in the population age pattern is likely to be the major issue
over the next few decades, as the growing ageing of the western
societies is likely to bring about a flurry of problems that are
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is attributable to the Author.currently underestimated, but that will entirely break out within
a few decades. 
It should be noted that the current framework of most welfare
state systems, particularly as to social security spending, is unable
to adequately tackle the problems related to a more and more
relevant ageing of the population, because social assistance costs
are bound to skyrocket from the next decade on. What is even
more worrying is the lack of a debate on ageing related problems,
particularly when it comes to the need to ensure the non-self-
sufficient elderly an acceptable quality of life. 
This embarrassing situation can clearly be seen in Italy, where
the social assistance systems show huge limits both in terms of
cost-effectiveness and intergenerational equity. The virtually total
lack of measures capable of guaranteeing the total assertion of
rights of citizenship and safeguarding the elderly’s dignity, in
particular those who are not self-sufficient, highlights the absolute
need to set up a social institution which may properly meet the
ever growing demand for social assistance.
In order for the weakest social classes to avoid a sharp welfare
loss, it is essential, given the impossibility to increase tax charges,
to reallocate public spending “qualitatively”. The latter should
combine economic growth and stability goals with social justice
objectives. The transfer of resources into a non self-sufficiency-
oriented public Fund that can assure an overall cover against such
risk would be instrumental in pursuing this target. 
This short essay consists of two separate yet interconnected
sections. The first section will introduce a three overlapping
generation model, which will try to determine the ageing effects on
individual saving and consumption decisions in the different stages
of the life cycle of a representative individual. From the results, it can
be inferred that a fertility rate decline will inevitably lead to a rise in
the individual saving rate, so as to compensate the higher costs for
social assistance services during the old age, whose equilibrium
consumption will probably be relatively lower. The model focuses on
the partial equilibrium aspects, in order to understand the direct
effects of demographic shocks on intertemporal consumption plans
in the different stages of the life cycle.
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analytical explanation for the need to set up a government-run
social institution, namely, an ad hoc non self-sufficiency Fund of
a mandatory and universal nature. This would be financed
through a mere transfer of resources from overall pension bill,
with a view to protecting the elderly from the non self-sufficiency
risk. From this analysis it can be implied, through simplified
assumptions about preferences and the risk aversion level in the
individuals, that such mandatory social insurance would
guarantee a level of relatively higher ex post individual welfare in
the event the single individual fails to get insured and makes his
decisions in a state of uncertainty, that is, reacting to the risk in
an imperfect way by setting up a precautionary saving fund. 
2. - Theoretical Overview
2.1 The Reference Model
The initial assumption is a three overlapping generation
economy where every economic agent goes through three different
life periods: working life, seniority and old age. In particular, the
term “elderly” will refer to individuals aged 65 to 75; the term
“late elderly” will indicate individuals aged more than 75. 
The choice of a model of this kind results from a distinction
within the non productive
1 population, which becomes necessary
when one wants to concentrate on the non self sufficient elderly’s
social assistance. The traditional overlapping generation models
usually tend to divide the overall population into young and old
people, assuming that the consumption typology of every group
relates to the needs that the individuals of that group must meet.
Such an analysis cannot cover the actual conduct of the economic
agents in the different stages of their life cycle, because the
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1 By non productive population we mean that population who has left the job
market upon reaching the retirement age. Such definition excludes there is a young
non productive population. In other words, it is assumed that the young population
is the population present on the job market. individuals that make up the elderly’s population may be facing
different states of nature, closely related to the age of the aforesaid
agents, which involve the fulfilment of different needs and, as a
result, the consumption of different goods and services. 
This assumption appears to be of particular significance, in
that it is clear that the needs of the elderly differ depending on
whether they are aged 65 to 75 — and in a relatively good psycho-
physical condition — or they are over 75, with a likelihood of a
kind of disability to occur
2.
These basic evaluations show that the three overlapping
generation model turns out to be the most useful for a complete
analysis, because if one deems the needs between workers and
elderly different, then a difference should also be made between
the needs of elderly and late elderly.
The choice to divide the overall non productive population
into two different categories is the result of an actual fact: in Italy,
there are about 2 million non self-sufficient people out of a
population of 10 million of over sixty-five, with a ten per cent
incidence for the population aged 65-74, a 20 per cent incidence
in the 75-79 range and an about 50 per cent incidence in the
population aged more than 80
3. 
Having defined such theoretical assumptions, we can assume
that every young worker offers a performance on the labour
market therefore receiving a money wage of wt, which is shared
among consumption of goods ct, saving st and mandatory social
contributions  ft. In the second stage of the life cycle, the agent
leaves the labour market having reached retirement age and,
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2 See for example the Bimonthly newsletter of Agenzia per i servizi sanitari
regionali (Agency for Regional Health Services) ASSR (2003), in particular the
reference to the “Study Commission for the prevention and treatment of non self-
sufficiency, especially regarding the elderly”, the conclusions of which were made
public in December 2002. 
3 See ISTAT (Central Statistics Institute) (2003). Future projections do not seem
to indicate a decline of such percentages: instead, thanks to the progress in
medicine and social assistance technologies according to the most realistic
scenarios, the non self-sufficiency rates are likely to stabilise, when not to decrease.
However, the rise of the elderly population will considerably raise the number of
non self-sufficient people, thus creating a social problem requiring adequate
resources to be solved. See for example CODA MOSCAROLA F.  (2003).according to the previous social assistance contributions paid,
receives a pension of pt+1. Consequently, his endowment for the
period will be equal to the sum of the social assistance
contribution paid by the young and his own savings accrued
during his working life; such endowment will be solely allocated
for health care and basic social assistance nt+1 and savings st+1. In
the third period, the individual reaches the “late elderly” stage,
thus receiving a pension of pt+2 also in this stage. As a result, the
individual’s endowment in the last stage of his life cycle will be
equal to the sum of the saving as previously accrued and the
pension transfer. Assuming there is no hereditary motive, such
endowment will be deemed as saving st+1, which will be entirely
used for the purchase of specific social assistance at+2
4.
First of all, it is necessary to stress the distinction between
variable n and variable a, because it includes the implications of
the model in question. Variable n refers to the combination of
health care and basic social assistance the elderly purchases to
satisfy his needs. However, the age rise poses a relevant issue, in
that it can cause particular states of nature forcing the late elderly
to necessarily consume, being of primary importance, general or
specific social assistance, defined by variable a. 
As mentioned earlier, the empirical data indicate a 40%
5
likelihood for the Italian late elderly population to face a condition
of non self-sufficiency; it follows that specific social assistance
consumption will concern a large share yet not the totality of the
late elderly population. 
We  may rightly argue that the observations made fail to
accurately describe the social reality, the majority of people over
75 being physically self-sufficient. It is however necessary to look
at the specific social assistance variable from two different
viewpoints closely related to two hypothetical states of nature the
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4 In other words, I am simply assuming that the pension transfer is considered
as a sort of “forced” saving by the elderly, which may enable him to face the risks
related to the health state in the last stage of his life cycle. This theory is justifiable
when looking at the growing medical care and social assistance consumption costs
upon the increase of the individuals’ age because of deterioration of their health
state. See for example ASSR (2003).
5 See ISTAT (2003).late elderly may go through. The first viewpoint refers to the
possibility of running into some form of non self-sufficiency,
which obviously requires a purchase of specific social assistance
to compensate for the loss of the main vital functions. The second,
on the contrary, pertains to a positive state of nature where the
individual is self-sufficient but nevertheless purchases social
assistance to protect his own rights and fulfil his interests. This
may appear contradictory as the demand for social assistance
undoubtedly varies according to the different state of nature.
Actually, it is not, simply because a condition of self-sufficiency
in the old age does not necessarily coincide with the individual’s
happiness. Indeed there are numerous factors to support this
assumption and are generally related to the social conditions
under which the older individuals live. The concept of specific
social assistance we refer to in this essay is a broad one
6. This
involves the social assistance needed to conduct vital daily
activities in case of loss of the ability to carry on them, but also
the support to pursue social opportunities for the full development
of the human potential, i.a. access to educational, cultural,
spiritual and recreational resources of society, but also the
guarantee to live in conditions of dignity and safety, as well as
being free from exploitation and mental and physical abuse
7.
If we agree on this theory, then we can understand, as in the
model shown, that the late elderly will demand and consume
specific social assistance when needed so as to compensate for
the loss of his vital functions; but he will also do the same to
avoid a condition of social alienation and/or loneliness precluding
him the right to live an active life in society. 
In addition, we notice that in the same model “individual
welfare” is considered as the consumption of an aggregate good
during the first period of the life cycle, as the consumption of
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6 If we agree on the United Nation’s theory on protection for the elderly, the
broad concept of social assistance defined herein enables us to state that a person’s
self-fulfilment involves the following five aspects: independence, participation,
protection, self-fulfilment and dignity.
7 In fact, «The union recognises and respects the elderly’s right to lead a decent,
independent life and to participate in the social and cultural life», EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, art. 25.health care and basic social assistance services during the second
period, and as the consumption of specific social assistance during
the third. We will also assume that the accrued saving will not
yield an interest rate
8. 
In order to make comparisons between monetary magnitudes,
we define:
— pc: price of consumer goods ct, for hypothesis equal to 1
and constant in time.
— ρt+1: price of the good nt+1. It jointly depends on the price
for medical care (medicines, drugs, etc.) pu and on the price of
basic social assistance wt+1/(1+rt+1) to the extent of ρt+1 =
θ[wt+1/(1+rt+1)] + (1–θ) pu. It appears clear that if parameter θ=1,
then ρt+1 coincides with the discounted wage expected at time t+1.
— ρt+2: price of good at+2. It is the reduced wage expected at
time t+2.
The foregoing can be expressed with the following formula:
(1)
We define the individual’s wealth in his life cycle as the sum
of the work generated income in the first period and the pension
of the second period, that is:
(2)
The preferences of an agent of the t
th generation are
represented by a generic function of intertemporal, additional and
in-time separable utility, u(ct)+u(nt+1)+u(at+2), where u(ct) is the
present utility of an individual of t
th generation arising from the
consumption of goods ct,  u(nt+1) is tomorrow’s utility resulting
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8 This is a restrictive hypothesis. It simplifies the analysis and it is due to the
effects of the partial equilibrium approach used to develop the model. from the consumption of health care and basic social assistance
services  nt+1, and u(at+2) the future utility resulting from the
consumption of specific social assistance at+2.
Later on we will assume that the function of the single period
utility is concave, and the marginal utility of consumption is
positive and decreasing, that is, ∂u(.)/∂xi>0 e ∂
2u(.)/∂
2xi<0 with
i=t, t+1, t+2 and x=c,n,a. Therefore, when choosing an individual
falling into the t
th generation, the problem will be the following:
(3)
We  express the impatience in time of the representative
individual by introducing an intertemporal preference rate q and
re-writing the consumer’s target function as follows:
(4)




Let us assume now that a shock occurs, affecting the fertility
rate in period t, causing its immediate reduction. In a closed
economy, assuming there is a productive sector where general
equilibrium conditions are observed, the effect of the fertility
rate decline in period t causes a rise in the real wage of the
subsequent period wt+1 due to a reduction of the job offer and
resulting increase in the bargaining power of the workers, but
also a reduction of interest rate r; this because the growth of
the real wage involves a shifting in the production function to
a new optimal combination of productive factors characterised
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9. The growth of the real
wage of the next generation combined with the reduction of the
real interest rate will unavoidably cause an increase of the
expected discounted wage, namely the price of good nt+1. We
also notice that such a shock does not change the level of the
current wage wt
10.
It is easy to understand that the fall of the fertility rate
involves, in the model, a reduction of consumption ct of the first
period so as to enable the consumer to tackle the expected
increase in the price of basic social assistance
11. In terms of
overall generational welfare, it can be noticed that this is bound
to shrink for the first generation (see Graph 1). On the contrary,
in terms of the collective welfare level of the period, or in
“intragenerational” terms, it can be noticed that this is likely to
drop in period t, because on an equal real income basis, young
people will reduce the demand for goods to face higher costs of
future social assistance, while the effect in period t+1 will be
ambiguous. Such ambiguity can be put down to the fact that the
new workers will now receive a higher real wage, while the elderly
will have to reduce their demand for healthcare and basic social
assistance to face the rise in the expected discounted wage of the
young caregivers. In other terms, we cannot determine the
“welfare effect” in period t+1 due to the presence of a wealth
effect caused by the decline of the fertility rate and resulting drop
of the job offer
12. 
Graph 1 shows the effects of the fertility rate fall on the
welfare level of generation 1. As can be observed graphically, the
shock will bring about a reduction of the inclination of the budget
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9 See HAMADA K. - RAUT L.R. (2003); BARRO R. - SALA-I-MARTIN X. (1995). In
the model I assume that wages and interest rate change exogenously. This is due
to the partial equilibrium approach that I use.
10 Please note that I am referring to a closed economy. I will oversee the
immigration effects.
11 This implication can also be found in the Buffer-Stock models. The literature
on the subject is rather extensive. See for example CARROL C.D. (1992, 1997, 2004);
DEATON A. (1991).
12 The following paragraph will examine how it is possible to bypass such
ambiguities by introducing a particular individual utility function and solving the
related constrained maximisation problem.RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
176
0 < D
2 + t a
1 + t n
t s 1 + t p
0 1 < D + t p
1 + t n 1 + t s
'
1 + t n
'
1 + t s
1 + t n
t c







EFFECT OF THE FERTILITY RATE DROP IN t
ON THE FIRST GENERATION WELFARE LEVEL*
* It should be noted that the variables indicated after the shock on the fertility
rate are marked with an apostrophe.constraint and, consequently, a reallocation of the resources
during the working period so as to decrease the level of the
demand for the consumer good as against a precautionary saving
aimed at bearing higher costs during seniority.
At the beginning of period t+1, the individual’s pension will
decline
13 because of the decrease in the number of taxpayers,
which will unavoidably end up shifting the constraint leftward,
thus leading to a lower consumption of healthcare, social
assistance and, as a result, welfare.
Even though the effects on consumption decisions will depend
on the income and replacement effects, we can anyway observe
that the fall of the fertility rate in t will cause a drop in the welfare
level of generation 1. 
2.2 Intertemporal Optimization
Previously, it was found that the net effects of the fertility rate
drop on consumption decisions depend on the income and
replacement effects. As a result, it was not possible to determine
the welfare effect in intragenerational terms, meaning among
generations in a specific period. 
A constrained maximisation exercise is needed to overcome
this problem. We can assume that individual preferences may be
represented by the intertemporal, additional and separable utility
function u(x)=x
1–σ /1 – σ, which is subject to the dynamic budget
constraint as previously expressed. In each period the utility
function is isoelastic, the intertemporal replacement elasticity
being equal to σ
–1. 
The consumer’s problem will be the following:
(7)
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13 I am assuming here a definite sharing system. In order to obtain the first order conditions, we define the
Lagrange function as follows:
(8)
By calculating the first partial derivatives, it will follow that:
(9)
Through some algebraic calculations we will obtain the values




By replacing such equations within the constraint we will
obtain the optimal values of the different variables: 
(13)
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it will follow that:
(16)
As can be noticed, the effect of ρt+1 and ρt+2, due to a decline
of the fertility rate, on the saving rate in period t will depend on
the value of parameter σ. 
Previously, it was observed that the fall of the fertility rate
would give rise to a reduction in the market interest rate. Given
that a rise in the interest rate produces a negative income effect
and a positive replacement effect on the saving function, the net
effect will depend on which of the two will prevail
14.
In this specific case, if σ>1 then the income effect will
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14 See HAMADA K. and RAUT L.R. (2003).dominate the replacement effect, thus the net effect of a reduction
in the saving interest rate will be positive
15. Empirical data show
that the US estimates, since the Second World War, have indicated
a 1< σ<4
16 value. If we agree on such data, we can state that a
decline in the fertility rate will increase the saving rate
17. 
Now let us focus on another key implication of the model:
what are the consequences on the demand for goods and services
in the periods following that relating to the shock on the fertility
rate, assuming that the shock is of an “exogenous nature”
18? The
new workers’ wage increase in t+1 will involve on the one hand, a
rise in the costs borne by the elderly for the purchase of basic
social assistance and care and, on the other hand, an increase in
the vital endowment of the young people of the new generation..
If we assume a lack of additional shocks on the fertility rate, then




t+1 referring to young
people’s consumption following the shock. In order to determine
the “welfare effect” in period t+1, we should compare the variation
extent of optimal demand for healthcare and basic social assistance
on the part of the first generation elderly with that of optimal
consumption of the aggregate good of the second generation young
people regardless of whether the shock occurs or not. By observing
the optimal solutions and assuming a σ>1 value, the response will
depend on the net variation between first generation elderly’s
consumption and that of the young people of the next generation.
The theoretical discussion defined ρt+1  = θ[wt+1/(1+rt+1)] +
(1–θ) pu, where if θ=1,  ρt+1=wt+1/ (1+rt+1). Considering that the
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15 Conversely, if σ<1 the substitution effect will dominate the income effect.
16 See HAMADA K. - RAUT L.R. (2003).
17 As can be observed from the equation s* the saving rate in the working
period will depend on prices ρt+1 and ρt+2 that is, on the workers’ expected reduced
wages in the two following periods. Considering that a fertility rate drop implies
an increase of the workers’ wage in the subsequent period and that σ>1, then we
may state that the shock will cause a rise in the saving rate in the first period of
the cycle. 
18 In order to analyse the direct implications of the model, I assumed that the
shock on the fertility rate will be exogenous and with a long-term impact. On the
contrary, an extended literature has identified the important links between fertility
and economic variables, highlighting their endogenous nature, such as EASTERLIN
R.A. (1966); LEIBENSTEIN H. (1974). For a model characterised by an endogenous
fertility, see BARRO R. - SALA-I-MARTIN X. (1995), Chap. IX. fertility rate fall in t will cause a wage increase in t+1 and a
reduction of the market interest rate, then the resulting increase
in the price of basic social assistance utilised by the elderly will
be more than proportional compared to the increase in the
workers’ wage. In unitary terms and assuming that the shock in
t+1 is of an exogenous nature, that means that the net variation
will show a minus sign. In fact, if we look at the structure of the
utility function by which we represented the preferences of the
representative individual, the optimal solutions provide us with
this indication. In other terms, the “welfare effect” in period t+1
will be negative. In addition, when considering that the demand
for specific social assistance on the part of the first generation
late elderly is determined by the choice made in the previous
period, that is by the demand for basic social assistance, then it
will shrink compared to the non-shock case.
We  can now assume that in every stage following the first
period, additional shocks constantly occur. In this case, the
negative impact on the welfare level is likely to be increasingly
sharp and will end up significantly affecting the welfare of the
elderly and late elderly populations, that will have to bear growing
costs to assure an increasingly expensive social assistance
19. In
fact, we can observe that a shock on the fertility rate in t+1 has
effects on population living in t+2 (see Table 1). The effects of
such shock is on third generation young’s consumption ct+2
through the growth of their purchasing power, on second
generation elderly consumption nt+2 as a consequence of a
precautionary saving due to increasing of specific social insurance,
and on first generation late elderly consumption at+2, because of
the reduction in their purchasing power. The overall welfare effect
is negative, considering the hypothesis on utility function and
intertemporal replacement elasticity.
In conclusion, we can state that in an economy characterised
by lack of immigration, the fertility rate decline will inevitably
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19 In this limiting case, the young populations’ choices would change. In fact,
they will tend to decrease their consumption to implement a precautionary saving
so as to assure resources for low-income periods with growing expenses.lead to a saving rate increase, so as to bear, during the old age,
the higher costs expected for social assistance services, whose
equilibrium consumptions will tend to be relatively lower
20.
(Please refer to the Appendix for the demonstration pertaining to
the trend of equilibrium social assistance consumption within a
framework of exogenous shock on the fertility rate) 
It is necessary underline that such results are due to the
effects of partial equilibrium approach of the model. In the future
I will examine these issues in a general equilibrium approach, in
order to inspect if the results and the conclusions differ.
From these conclusions it is interesting to look whether
there is room for public measures which can lead individuals
not to change their consumption plans, that is, to avoid reacting
to uncertain future health conditions in an improper way by
setting up a precautionary saving fund. An answer to this
question will be the target of the next paragraph, which will
also try to show that an ad hoc Fund against non self-sufficiency
universal and with mandatory participation — can curb the
economic and social costs related to the growing ageing of the
population.
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20  Several works within the extended literature on intertemporal choices
estimate dynamic consumption models, pinpointing existing links between the
income and consumption trend in the first part of the life cycle, but also showing
that the empirical data indicate accrued wealth as the retirement age approaches.
See for example ATTANASIO  O.P. - BANKS  J. - MEGHIR  C. - WEBER  G. (1999);




Tt +1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Generation 1 Ct N t+1 A t+2
Generation 2 C t+1 N t+2 A t+3
Generation 3 C t+2 N t+3 A t+43. - Insurance Against the non Self-sufficiency Risk 
This section will try to examine, through analytical means,
that a mere transfer of resources from the overall pension bill to
a social institution aimed at covering the non self-sufficiency risk
in the elderly population can curb costs related to the population
ageing in terms of individual and collective welfare. The aim will
be to show that the setting up of an ad hoc fund against this risk
is of vital importance, especially in Italy, a country where
households play a crucial role in supporting the disabled elderly
population. 
First of all, it should be noted that the insurance against the
non self-sufficiency risk can be taken out both through the private
insurance market and public institutions. Public or private
insurance can be seen as a contract linked to occurrence of an
uncertain event, and be such as to reduce the random fluctuations
of the individuals’ marginal utility
21. In particular, public insurance
can be seen as an institution that, with a view to protecting
individuals against the consequences of negative events, lock up
their strategies, for example forcing them to save
22. 
The risks of a target-oriented conduct and private market-
related failures, the affirmation of redistribution ideals and the
protection of the poor’s needs are some of the reasons leading to
consider setting up a Government-run Universal Fund against non
self-sufficiency, capable of offering all social assistance services
without altering the individuals’ financial conditions. The target to
aim at is the so-called «German model» in which risk socialization
is practically total
23. In this scheme, in fact, the individual financial
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21 See ABEL A.B. (1988).
22 See FORNERO E. - MANDRONE E. (2000).
23 For a discussion on the different non self-sufficiency social assistance models
adopted in Europe, see the bimonthly newsletter of Agenzia per i servizi sanitari
regionali, ASSR (2003). In the so-called “German model”, the financing to the public
social assistance fund is guaranteed through a contribution rate on the taxable
income of each individual, which is the same for all the social assistance
beneficiaries and throughout the national territory. The extent of the contribution,
determined by the national law, is expected to account for 1.7%, and is charged,
in equal parts, to employers, workers or former workers (definite sharing system)
with a ceiling of about monthly 57 Euro. 90% of the population obtain compulsorycondition is not a selection criterion for social assistance access,
in that income redistribution is guaranteed both ex ante, in favour
of the individuals exposed to a higher risk, and ex post, to the
benefit of the needy. Presently, such risk is very partially socialized
in Italy, because non self-sufficient people are called on to share
public social assistance costs; also, they have to privately buy a
large number of social assistance services and they have to resort
to the help of relatives and friends to meet their needs
24. 
Let us create a reference model, assuming there is an
insurance market where the following conditions are met:
— The risks faced by the different individuals are independent
one another; in other terms, the likelihood that an unfavourable
state of nature affecting an individual is independent of the
likelihood affecting another individual; the law of large numbers
applies accordingly.
— There is such absence of informative asymmetry as to
prevents the insurer from having the same information as the
insured;
Let us retrace the traditional method of textbooks on
insurance in perfect competition with zero insurance cover costs.
We  define by π the likelihood for the damage to occur and by
(1–π) the likelihood for the damage not to occur. The damage (d)
the individual may suffer refers to the loss of some physical or
mental ability involving a non self-sufficiency condition. For the
purpose of the analysis, we assume that the non self-sufficiency
condition involves the same damage for all individuals in terms
of wealth levels
25. We also define by δk the insurance premium
and by k the allowance paid to the insured by the insurance
company in case of a damage. 
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insurance through self-run health care banks, while the remaining 10% resort to
private insurance companies. The state carries out control functions and creates
the framework to allow the different operators of the sector to collaborate with
each other. The beneficiaries of this fund can choose between allowance in money,
in kind or in services: they are the disabled, of any age, who are incapable of
carrying on some or all the four basic functions in their daily lives (ADL - Activity
of Daily Living): 1) Personal hygiene; 2) nutrition; 3) mobility; 4) household care.
24 See BELTRAMETTI L. (2003).
25 This theory, albeit restrictive, significantly simplifies the analysis and allows
us to draw definite conclusions.The problem of the insurance company, which in theory is
neutral to risks, will be that of maximising the profit, that is:
(17) max π(δk)+( 1–π) δk
Knowing that the maximum profit of a firm in a competitive
market is zero, we can reformulate the target function as follows
(18) π(δk)+( 1–π) δk=0
By algebraically solving the target function of the insurance
company, we obtain the relation between premium and allowance
in perfect competition conditions:
(19) δk= πk
In other terms, it can be noticed that a competitive market
offers a fair premium and a fair allowance
26. In this way, the
individual will be indifferent to the income levels related to the
two different states of nature
The problem of the individual is instead that of maximising
the utility resulting from the two possible states of nature; if we
define by z1 the endowment in the unfavourable state of nature,
that is that of the damage occurrence, and by z2, the endowment
in the state of nature in which the individual suffers no damage,
the target function of a generic individual will be expressed as
follows:
(20) max π u(z1)+( 1 – π) u (z2)
(21) max π u(z – d – δk+k )+(1–π) u (z – δk)
Knowing that the premium is fair δk=πk, partially diverting
from the allowance, it will follow that:
(22) u'( z1)=u'( z2)
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26 This means that the non self-sufficiency risk cover is effected at a fair rate,
that is, the expected insurance value will be equal to its cost.The equation shows that the equality of marginal utilities
must apply. In other terms, the marginal utility of an additional
Euro in case of an unfavourable state of nature shall be equal to
the marginal utility of an additional Euro in case of non-
occurrence. In order for the marginal utility to be equal z1 = z2.
By replacing this condition in the first derivative and solving
algebraically, it will follow that:
(23) k = d
The result so obtained indicates that in a competitive market
where the insurance company offers a fair premium, the best
solution for the individual is to pay such a premium as to match
allowance and damage
27. 
Going back to the pattern of the previous sections, we assume
that the representative individual is aware that there will be a
certain likelihood π of being non self-sufficient in the last period
of his life cycle. For the sake of clarity, we also assume that the
problem of non self-sufficiency risk protection is only handled by
the individual in the old age
28. 
From Italy-related data, it can be inferred that the likelihood
of facing some form of non self-sufficiency is 20% for the
population aged more than sixty-five
29. We can also assume that
the individual does not save during his working life and that
therefore his endowment in his old age is equal to the pension
transfer standardised at 1 Euro. If we establish that non self-
sufficiency involves a 50% damage in terms of overall endowment
to the individual, we wonder which premium a risk-averse
individual will be willing to pay to be insured against such a
negative state of nature.
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27 It is easy to understand that in this specific case, the risk-averse individual
will always and entirely get insured.
28 Recent literature on wealth accumulation in the life cycle highlights that
empirical data indicate precautionary saving forms in the older age which can be
attributed to demographic or income shocks, which is at odds with the behaviour
of consumer’s conduct in the life cycle model. See for example, ATTANASIO P.O. -
BANKS J. - MEGHIR C. - WEBER G. (1995); CAGETTI M. (2003).
29 The likelihood, as observed earlier, will tend to increase with the growing
age of the individuals.If the market is in perfect competition conditions, the
allowance paid to the insured by the insurance company will be
equal to the damage (k=d); the individual, therefore, will be
insured by 0.5 Euro paying a premium of δk. The premium and
allowance being fair, it will follow that δ k=πk hence  δ = π.
Assuming that π=20%, then the individual will pay a premium of
0,2*0,5 Euro = 0,1 Euro. In this case, regardless of whether the
favourable state of nature occurs or not, the individual will
consume exactly the same quantity.
Another way to be insured against the risk could be to resort
to the annuity market, because it has a huge impact on the
consumption model in the life cycle. Yaari (1965) was the first to
move in this direction analysing, through the use of an overlapping
generation model, the impact of uncertainty on life duration in the
consumption pattern. He concluded that the presence of a fair
annuity market could lead to the same consumption mechanisms
of the certain scenario. More recently, literature extends Yaari’s
30
work to multiple directions. Latest research on the so-called
annuity “puzzle” leads to conclude, however, that these are not fair
in terms of present value due to the presence of adverse selection
and of administrative costs the insurance company must bear
31.
A different way to protect individuals from the risk could be
that of taking out policies which may share it among all individuals
32.
With about 2 out of 10 million elderly being non self-sufficient, the
overall monetary loss will total 1 million Euro. In other terms, each
elderly will be faced with an expected loss of 0.1 Euro. When
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30 For a systematic overview of specific literature reference should be made to
i.a. LEVHARI D. - MIRMAN L. (1977); DAVIES J. (1981); BÜTLER M. (2001).
31 See MITCHELL O. - POTERBA J.M. - WARSHAWSKY M.J. (1997). This brilliant
work shows that annuities are not fair in terms of current value because as for
individuals with an average life expectancy, they insure solely 75 to 84 cents per
dollar of premium paid.
32  The risk sharing issue within the framework of demographic ageing is
analyzed by KRUSE  A. (2002). This work compares the intergenerational
redistribution effects in the different pension schemes caused by demographic and
economic changes. It also identifies a potential trade-off between financial stability
of the pension system and intergenerational redistribution. BOHN  H. (1999)
demonstrates that, with a fertility rate being affected by an idiosyncratic shock, a
social protection system providing defined benefits is ex ante more efficient than
a defined contribution system or a private insurance system.assuming that each individual may wish to diversify the risk,
transferring a part of it to the others, it will follow that 10 million
elderly will be mutually insured, by joining a Fund aimed at covering
the overall damage caused by non self-sufficiency. The overall
damage amounting to 1 million Euro, each elderly shall pay a
premium of 0.1 Euro. This means that if 2 out of 10 elderly suffer
a 0.5 Euro damage, everyone shall pay a 0.05 Euro to each non self-
sufficient elderly, that is an overall premium of 0.1 Euro. A way to
implement this risk sharing could be to set up a non self-sufficiency
fund, run by the government and subject to mandatory participation.
As found in these two simple examples, the overall social
assistance cost remains unchanged independently of risk sharing
or a collective cover. In this case, there are no reasons to support
the need for a mandatory collective approach other than an
individual one. It should, however, be noted that the voluntary
individual approach is only feasible if the theories expressed earlier
are observed, meaning only if the markets are complete and, as a
result, able to perfectly neutralize the individual uncertainty.
The main problem arising within the framework of complete
markets is to ascertain if and how complete they are. Individual
risks can undoubtedly be reduced by signing insurance or financial
agreements, but it is also true that most individual risks can hardly
be insured officially due to adverse selection or moral hazard
problems
33. In the presence of realistic theories on conduct and
opportunities, the private market for the cover of certain risks does
not exist, is inefficient, or inaccessible to most of the population.
In such cases, public insurance can replace them through social
protection schemes, thus leading to an improvement of general
welfare
34.
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33  See JAPPELLI  T. - PISTAFERRI  L. (2000). We can note that the larger a
community, the easier the task of insuring individual risks; conversely, the larger
a community, the weaker the solidarity constraints and, therefore, the willingness
to help the needy. BORCH K.H. (1990); EECKHOUDT L. - GOLLIER C. (1992) also point
out that the complete insurance that can eliminate the unpleasant consequences
of any kind of risk is not related to moral hazard and anti-selection problems
hindering the private offer of different kinds of insurance.
34 See FORNERO  E. - MANDRONE  E. (2000). See also the final report of the
COMMISSION FOR MACROECONOMIC CONSISTENCY OF SOCIAL SPENDING (Onofri
Commission) (1997) and MONACELLI D. (1998).In the complete market model, the elderly save only if they
expect reduced endowment in the next future; however, they are
totally indifferent to the endowment-related risk. On the contrary,
if markets are not complete, the individual will react to the risk
only in an imperfect way, through the setting up of a precautionary
saving fund. The incentive to distribute resources among periods
is accompanied, in this case, by that of limiting the negative effects
of uncertainty through saving
35. 
Therefore, let us try to understand the impact of uncertainty
on individual intertemporal choices when markets are incomplete.
The main difference from the complete market case is that now
the intertemporal dynamic budget constraint only applies after
random variables have produced an effect, that is, ex post.
Moving back to the previous model and assuming, in simple
terms, that the interest rate is null, we can define the target
function of the average consumer as follows:
(24) E(u)=u(ct)+βu(nt+1)+β
2E[u(ãt+2)]
The problem of the individual’s choice, therefore, will be the
following:
(25)
where ˜ d is the monetary damage caused by the loss of self-
sufficiency that, in theory, will occur with a π likelihood. We can
notice that the social assistance consumption in period t+2 is
uncertain and dependent on the extent of the monetary damage.
The individual may therefore be faced with an unfavourable state
of nature, causing a minor social assistance consumption (a
–
t+2),
or in a favourable state of nature characterised by sound physical
and mental state (a
+
t+2). Bearing in mind these observations, the
target function of the consumer can be rewritten as follows:
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As can be noticed, the target function is a multi-period
equation which can be converted into a sequence of two-period
equations assuming that the consumer is short-sighted. This
theory may appear restrictive; yet, when accepting the empirical
consequences of the uncertain life model as for the vital wealth
profile, we may likewise argue that the non self-sufficiency rate
being low among young people, then the non self-sufficiency risk
uncertainty will solely affect the conduct and intertemporary
decisions of the elderly
36. In the early period t+1 the individual is
in fact old and, having examined the results of the income and
interest rate which was assumed to be null, will have a new
expectation influencing his choice of health care and basic social
assistance in t+1 and social assistance consumption in t+2. 
The problem with converting a multi-period equation into a
sequence of two-period equation can be solved through the
dynamic programming system
37, which consists in defining the
optimal value function of the problem, i.e.
(27)
where  Et indicates the expectation subject to the available
information in period t. The above equation accounts for the
maximum value of the expected utility discounted at time t, which
the consumer obtains from the optimal consumption sequence
corresponding to an initial wealth endowment. By defining a value
function, the multi-period problem comes down to a sequence of
two-period recursive problems which can be expressed through
the Bellman equation
38, namely,
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36 HANSEN G.D. -
.
IMROHORO ˘ GLU S. (2005) find that, in absence of an annuity
market and with a social system insuring against uncertainty, the saving in the life
cycle model regards the old age. In other words, the peak of the consumption in
the “hump shaped” model is only reached in the old age. 
37 See LUCAS E.R. - STOCKEY N. - PRESCOTT E.C. (1989).
38 See JAPPELLI T. - PISTAFERRI L. (2000) for the solution to the multi-period
problem in a sequence of two period problems.(28)
This equation indicates that with the information available in
period t, the consumer formulates expectations on future income
and interest rates and chooses a consumption as if such
expectations should be fulfilled. In the following period, the
consumer, after observing the income performance, will formulate
a new expectation leading him to choose the kind of consumption
in that specific period.
In our case, the problem of the consumer in period t will be:
(29) max ut(ct)+βut+1(nt+1)
The target function obtained indicates that in the first period,
the individual will choose, given his specific preferences, such an
optimal combination of goods, health care and basic social
assistance as to maximize his intertemporary utility. The consumer
being, as assumed, “short-sighted”, he will not take into account
the uncertainty on his future health state. In other words, in the
early period t+1, the quantity of nt+1 will no longer be determined
because the elderly shall reconsider his future choices while
bearing in mind the uncertainty on his future health conditions.
The problem of the consumer in period t+1 will be
accordingly:
(30)
where d is the damage, which will be negative with a π likelihood
and null with a likelihood of (1–π).
The following first order conditions can be obtained from the
system:
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First of all, it should be noticed that nt+1 changes upon change
of the likelihood of being non self-sufficient. Should the consumer
be risk-averse, it will follow that:
(33)
which gives rise to a precautionary saving ∂nt+1 / ∂π <0 .
However, we must understand that the optimal value of nt+1
will depend on the convexity on the marginal utility function, thus
from the sign of the third derivative of the utility function. The
Jensen inequality applied to convex functions will lead to uE(xt+1)
< Eu(xt+1), that is, the marginal utility of expected consumption
is lower than the expected value of marginal utility. In this case,
to observe the first order condition, the consumer will aim at
reducing his consumption in the first period to reduce the
expected marginal utility in the second period, thus increasing that
of the previous period. Actually, the utility function convexity




For the purpose of the analysis, an isoelastic utility function
u(x) = x
1–σ /1 –σ will therefore be used, with σ>0,  u' = x
–σ,  u'' =
–σx
–σ–1,  u''' = –σ(1+σ)x
–σ–2 and where the degree of absolute risk
aversion –u''(x)/u'(x) is on the decrease. In short, we will use a
particular case of the isoelastic function for the analytical
handling: the logarithmic function u(x)=ln(x).
We  assume that the pension value is given and is equal to 1
Euro and that, to put it briefly, the market interest rate is null.
Previously we found that the likelihood of an elderly to face some
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39 We must however note that in order for that to be true the utility function
must not be quadratic, because in this case the individual is risk-averse (u''< 0)
but, at the same time, he does not react to the risk through a precautionary saving
(u'''= 0).form of non self-sufficiency is equal to π = 0.2. Also, we assume
that the non self-sufficiency damage involves a 50% loss of the
endowment. Given the utility function of a logarithmic nature, we
can determine the consumer’s optimal choices in conditions of
uncertainty, or when the individual personally faces the non self-
sufficiency risk without insurance due to incomplete private
insurance market.
To make it simple, we fix the service prices equal to unit ρt+2
= ρt+1 =1  and assume that in the first period there is no saving,
so that the endowment will be equal to the pension transfer in




We expressed impatience to time through a psychological rate
of intertemporary preference whose value increases as future
consumption decreases. Considering that the individual is aware
of the risk he may face in the third period of his life cycle, we
assume that the value of such rate is relatively low, in that it will
attach importance to specific social assistance consumption
during the old age. Therefore, setting q=0.2, our target function
will be:
(36) E[u]=ln(nt+1)+0.83[0.2ln(50–nt+1)+0.8ln(100–nt+1)]
By partially diverting from nt+1 and algebraically solving an
equation of second degree, we will obtain the economically




The values of in the negative and positive state of nature will
be respectively:
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What can be inferred from such results? They indicate that
the individual will react to the risk only in an imperfect way,
through precautionary saving. In other words, an incentive is
created to reduce the negative effects of uncertainty through
saving.
In order to understand these observations, it is necessary to
compare the results obtained with those that would be obtained
in case of complete markets with a competitive insurance offering
a fair premium, or the results which could be obtained with a
government-run institutional fund allowing a risk diversification
through a mandatory participation by a transfer of resources from
the overall pension bill to the fund.
As mentioned earlier, the individual, with both insurance
covers, will pay a premium of 0.1 Euro and regardless of the
damage occurrence, he will receive the same resources, amounting
to 0.9 Euro. In both situations, the individual will have to face a
state of certainty. If we take into account the previous discussions,
we find that the setting up of a collective fund against the non
self-sufficiency risk can eliminate the uncertainty related to such
risk. 
If we keep the prices ρt+2 = ρt+1 = 1 constant and assume there
is no saving in the first period, the choice problem, given the utility
function u(x)=ln(x), will be:
(39)
Hence the Lagrange formula
(40) L = ln(nt+1)+βln(at+2)–λ[nt+1+at+2 – 0,9 Euro]
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is q = 0.2, the following optimal solutions will be obtained:
(42) n* t+1 = 0.49 a* t+2 = 0.40
As seen in these solutions, the uncertainty and incomplete
market case involves an excessive distribution of resources in the
favourable state of nature. This can be put down to the fact that
the individual cannot affect the level of saving in the two different
states of nature. To protect himself from the risk of suffering the
non self-sufficiency damage, he is forced to save even when not
necessary, for instance when the damage fails to occur. The fund
scheme, by contrast, allows the selection and transfer of the
saving in the two states of nature, while the precautionary saving
enables solely a consumption stabilization between the different
periods.
It would also be more reasonable to assume that the presence
of the fund induces individuals to a less cautious, more impatient
conduct towards consumption of the first period considered,
because the guarantee of public protection helps raise the
consumption level. In other words, the impatience rate could
increase, highlighting the effects previously discussed.
What does all this mean in terms of welfare? If we talk in ex
ante terms, the welfare level turns out to be the same. However,
in  ex post terms, this is not true, because in the non insurance
case there is an excessive distribution of resources in the
favourable state of nature, as against a precautionary saving in
the first period. When examining the assumptions related to the
form of the utility function and the attitude of the individual
toward the risk, if the individual could be fairly insured, he would
be willing to waive some units of good at+2 to obtain some
additional units of good nt+1.
Given the logarithmic form of the utility function, when
calculating the level that would be reached in the fund and non
fund cases, a substantial difference can be inferred: in numerical
terms, considering the previously assumed data and the optimal
solutions obtained, the individual utility will suffer a rise of
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system with full risk socialisation
40.
Even though the exercise is based on simplified assumptions
on the individual’s preferences, risk aversion and aggregation of
individual preferences, the results indicate that the ex post creation
of a non self-sufficiency fund could raise individual and collective
welfare. 
Although it is hard to establish the sources generating the
economic resources to ensure the most suitable performances for
every citizen, a fundamental issue arises: the absolute need to set
up an ad hoc non self-sufficiency fund as an independent social
assistance program, with the task of running a public insurance
against such risk.
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40 Likewise it can be found that in FORNERO E. - MANDRONE E. (2000), when
realistic assumptions affect conducts and opportunities, the private market for the
cover of certain risks does not exist or is inefficient. In such case, it is replaced
by public insurance with social protection schemes leading to an improvement in
general social assistance.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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